El homenaje se me quedó esperando

Atando los cabos sueltos del machismo en el sistema judicial de Puerto Rico

2011-08-17T16:06:00.000-04:00

En un país de menos de cuatro millones de habitantes en el que en apenas siete meses han muerto al menos 25 mujeres por causa de la violencia machista, no es de extrañar que se pregone por todos los rincones el mito de las mujeres que abusan del sistema judicial mediante la fabricación de casos de violencia doméstica en contra de sus (ex)parejas. Lo promueven esos machos que gritan, empujan, abusan, destruyen psiquis y matan mujeres a diario como “defensa a su honra”; tratando de escapar así de las consecuencias legales y morales de sus actos. Lo promueven las abogadas y los abogados de defensa como recurso para obtener veredictos de no culpabilidad a favor de sus clientes, sin pensar en las consecuencias que sus actos tienen en la promoción de una violencia que ha hecho – y continúa a hacer – estragos en nuestra sociedad. Lo promueven los jueces y las juezas que reducen sentencias porque aún piensan que asesinar a una (ex)pareja por un “ataque de celos” no es un acto premeditado, sino un acto de súbita pendencia o un arrebato de cólera. Lo promueven los medios de comunicación con las intrigas novelísticas en que mujeres despechadas o malvadas toman venganza y destruyen la reputación de santos varones al acusarlos de tan vil crimen. Y lo promueven las mujeres y hombres que con su silencio y anuencia llegan a veredictos – dentro y fuera del tribunal – de no culpabilidad basándose únicamente en el mito de la mujer mentirosa que abusa del sistema judicial. Pero que lo promueva – bien sea por inadvertencia – el propio sistema de justica, es una acción intolerable que debe ser rechazada y corregida prontamente por nuestras legisladoras y legisladores y por el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico.

Recientemente, lo sencillo que es manipular el sistema de justicia para promover este mito de la mujer que abusa del sistema judicial y perpetuar los esquemas de machismo que nos destruyen quedó evidenciado en el caso de violencia doméstica en contra del ex-representante Luis Farinacci. El jurado encontró no culpable al ex-representante, aunque varios testigos corroboraron lo alegados actos de violencia que sufrió la señora Liza Yajaira Rivera por parte de Farinacci. ¿Qué creó la duda razonable en el jurado? Una solicitud de préstamo que había presentado Liza Yajaira para comprarse un auto de lujo en la cual mintió. La defensa aprovechó este acto previo de mendacidad no relacionado con la acusación de violencia doméstica para desacreditar la credibilidad de Liza Yajaira. Con ese simple acto de mendacidad la defensa consiguió acceso directo al imaginario que impera en la Isla de la mujer despechada/malvada que abusa del sistema judicial por venganza o simplemente para mortificar a su ex(pareja). Una vez allí, el asunto fue bastante sencillo.

Liza Yajaira dejó de ser la alegada víctima de actos horrendos, para convertirse en una mentirosa más; en una de esas mujeres que mienten y quieren destruir a sus (ex)parejas acusándolos de violencia doméstica porque sufren de despecho o simplemente gozan de importunar a sus (ex)parejas para obtener lo que de otro modo no pueden obtener. La alegada víctima pasó a ser la alegada agresora. Liza Yajaira por haber mentido una que otra vez en su pasado, por ser mujer – sobre todo por ser mujer –, y por hablar de violencia machista en los tribunales era ahora la mujer despechada que fabrica casos de violencia doméstica. Así el trabajo de la Fiscalía fue transformado por la defensa. Fiscalía ya no debía probar que Farinacci la maltrataba, debía probar que Liza Yajaira no quería hacerle daño a su alegado agresor y que estaba allí porque verdaderamente era una víctima y no una mujer despechada o malvada. Y todo eso sólo porque mintió una vez para comprarse un auto de lujo.

¿Qué tiene que ver la gimnasia con la magnesia? Pues usualmente nada. Para eso es que hemos creado un sistema probatorio; para evitar que actos que no tienen nada que ver con lo que se juzga sean tomados en cuenta por los juzgadores; para que nuestros prejuicios no se conviertan en los dictadores de sentencias; para poder encontrar la verdad y hacer justicia. Sin embargo, el sistema nunca es perfecto y siempre quedan algunos cabos sueltos. Cabos sueltos que a veces suelen ser muy peligrosos cuando se combinan con culturas de odio. Cabos sueltos que puede derrocar la justicia cuando son aprovechados por grupos que pretenden preservar su poder mediante la subyugación de otros. En este caso, como en el pasado, esos cabos sueltos perjudican grandemente a las mujeres.

En el pasado nuestro sistema probatorio debió atar los cabos sueltos de las reglas de evidencia y de los estatutos penales y civiles que obstaculizaban el debido juzgamiento de las agresiones sexuales y actos de hostigamiento sexual en contra de las mujeres.[1] Tuvimos que ajustar las reglas para que las mujeres pudieran testificar sin miedo a ser victimizadas y juzgadas por sus decisiones en el pasado. En el pasado ajustamos las reglas para que esos cabos sueltos del machismo no se convirtieran en fuente de subyugación y el sistema judicial quedara libre de la violencia en contra de las mujeres imperante en nuestra sociedad. Así, se logró deshacerse de los factores que desincentivaban a las mujeres a acudir a los tribunales a buscar amparo para este tipo de agresiones al tiempo que se preservaba el derecho de todo acusado a un juicio justo y a impugnar la prueba en su contra.

Hoy, llega el momento de atar esos cabos sueltos del machismo nuevamente. Nuestro País necesita que las mujeres se sientan cómodas en acudir a los tribunales y denunciar los actos de violencia en su contra sin temer por ser demonizadas como mentirosas, despechadas y malvadas. Es el momento de que el sistema juzgue adecuadamente los crímenes de violencia doméstica. Hace falta mucho más que salas especializadas de violencia doméstica. Hace falta que el sistema reconozca que es víctima y partícipe de esa violencia machista que ha matado e incapacitado a miles de mujeres en nuestro País.

Hablo de las mujeres, aunque una reforma aplique a todas las víctimas de violencia doméstica, porque estos cabos sueltos que permiten la impugnación de la alegada víctima de violencia doméstica por cualquier acto de mendacidad afecta casi exclusivamente a las mujeres. Por ejemplo, si el caso de Farinacci hubiera sido a la inversa la defensa no hubiera tenido disponible el imaginario del hombre despechado/malvado que miente para hacerle daño a su agresora. Por el contrario, en el imaginario puertorriqueño estaría la idea un hombre “afeminado”, “medio hombre” que es víctima de su mujer. Por tanto, sería imposible que mintiera en este caso aun si lo hubiera hecho en el pasado, porque “humillarse” y “renunciar a su masculinidad” así voluntariamente en público no es un recurso disponible para los hombres a menos que los eventos hayan ocurrido en realidad.

El caso no es igual para las mujeres, el imaginario político y machista de nuestro pueblo hace que un simple acto de mendacidad la coloque en una posición precaria, en la posición de la mujer despechada o malvada que abusa del sistema judicial. Aun cuando existan testigos que puedan verificar su versión y que no puedan ser desacreditados por actos de mendacidad, este imaginario es casi imposible de superar. Los testigos que pueden verificar los actos de violencia – que en la mayoría de los casos son casi inexistentes, ya que la violencia suele ocurrir en la vida íntima de la pareja – no suelen servir para superar esta visión peyorativa de las víctimas de violencia doméstica, ya que por la naturaleza de estos actos estos testigos suelen estar asociados por lazos sanguíneos o emocionales a la alegada víctima. Así que la desacreditación de la credibilidad de la alegada víctima se propaga instantáneamente a los otros testigos de la Fiscalía, ya que los testigos suelen considerarse como que están viciados a favor de la alegada víctima por los lazos que los unen con ella. De este modo, el imaginario de la mujer despechada/malvada que abusa del sistema judicial controla el juicio aprovechándose de esos cabos sueltos en el derecho probatorio y ningún testigo de corroboración puede hacer mucho para cambiar ese panorama y punir al verdadero agresor.

¿Pero cuáles específicamente son esos cabos sueltos? Se trata de poder traer prueba con poco valor probatorio debido a su falta de pertinencia o bajo nivel de pertinencia pero con un alto valor inflamatorio para el testimonio de la alegada víctima al tiempo que se permite que prejuicios sean los principios juzgadores del caso. Si bien la Regla 401 de Evidencia establece que “[e]videncia pertinente es aquélla que tiende a hacer la existencia de un hecho, que tiene consecuencias para la adjudicación de la acción, más probable o menos probable de lo que sería sin tal evidencia” y la mentira en una solicitud en un préstamo de auto no tiende a probar la existencia de una acto de violencia doméstica, la propia regla provee para que este acto inconexo con la acusación se vuelva pertinente. La regla provee a su vez que evidencia pertinente incluye aquélla “que sirva para impugnar o sostener la credibilidad de una persona testigo o declarante.”

Si bien todos somos conscientes que una mentira no hace a una persona un mentiroso recurrente, al igual que un solo asesinato no convierte a una persona en asesino recurrente. Las reglas de evidencia parecen obviar ese primer pequeño destello de sabiduría común a favor tanto de las personas acusadas de un delito como las demandadas en una causa de acción civil. Así la regla 609 provee que en el contrainterrogatorio se podrá inquirir sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad a discreción del tribunal para impugnar el carácter mendaz o veraz del testigo si bien no se permitirá prueba extrínseca sobre ello. Esta discreción del Tribunal debería estar un poco más limitada en los casos de violencia doméstica, para que la defensa no pueda utilizar actos específicos de mendacidad de la alegada víctima no relacionados con la acusación para argumentar que es una mujer que abusa del sistema judicial que acusa falsamente al acusado sin más prueba que aquella de que mintió en el pasado en nada que tiene que ver con un procedimiento judicial o con la acusación de violencia doméstica, y que el acusado está sufriendo los efectos negativos comúnmente asociados a ser acusado de un delito. De este modo, se propendería un verdadero ambiente seguro y empático a las víctimas de violencia doméstica más allá del de las salas especializadas; y el Estado sería un partícipe activo en la erradicación de una cultura machista que destruye cada día con más fuerza la sociedad puertorriqueña.

Una posible enmienda a las Reglas de Evidencia a estos efectos podría ser la siguiente.

REGLA 615. IMPUGNACIÓN MEDIANTE CONDUCTA ESPECÍFICA EN CASOS DE VIOLENCIA DOMÉSTICA

(A) En cualquier acción criminal en la que se alegue conducta constitutiva del delito de violencia doméstica, se podrá inquirir en el contrainterrogatorio sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad de la alegada víctima según se dispone en la Regla 609 siempre y cuando el Tribunal luego del procedimiento provisto en esta regla determine que la defensa posee prueba para demostrar al juzgador que la alegada víctima intenta acusar maliciosamente o falsamente a la persona acusada.

(B) Procedimiento para determinar si se podrá inquirir sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad de la alegada víctima

(1) La determinación en cuanto a si la persona acusada podrá inquirir en el contrainterrogatorio sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad de la alegada víctima, la hará una Jueza o un Juez distinto al que interviene en la consideración de los méritos de la acción criminal en una vista en la que se brinde a las partes la oportunidad de presentar prueba al respecto. El acusado deberá:

(a) presentar una moción sostenida en declaración jurada en la cual describa de forma específica:

i. la evidencia en la que pretende basar su contrainterrogatorio,

ii. que además del acto específico de mendacidad de la alegada víctima no relacionado con el caso en cuestión posee evidencia de que la alegada víctima ha mentido en procedimiento judiciales anteriores o que miente en la presente acusación de violencia doméstica,

iii. que posee prueba que la alegada víctima desea causar daños a la persona acusada mediante la acusación más allá de los efectos negativos comúnmente asociados a ser acusado de un delito,

iv. el propósito del contrainterrogatorio;

(b) someter la moción por lo menos 14 días antes del juicio, excepto si el Tribunal, por justa causa, establece un plazo distinto o permite que se presente durante el juicio;

(c) notificar la moción al Ministerio Público y a la alegada víctima. Cuando ésta sea menor o incapacitada, la notificación deberá efectuarse a su tutor o representante legal.

(2) Al terminar la vista, si el Tribunal determina que el contrainterrogatorio sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad de la alegada víctima que se propone realizar la persona acusada es pertinente y que su naturaleza inflamatoria o perjudicial no tendrá un peso mayor que su valor probatorio, dictará una orden escrita indicando que dicha línea de interrogatorio es permitida y determinará la extensión de dicho cuestionamiento. La persona acusada entonces podrá realizar el contrainterrogatorio sobre actos específicos de veracidad o mendacidad de la alegada víctima de acuerdo con la orden del Tribunal.

Este texto garantizaría los derechos del acusado a un juicio justo y a impugnar la prueba en su contra a la vez que proveería a las víctimas las garantías necesarias para entrar a un proceso judicial en el que no sean doblemente victimizadas. Así podríamos encaminarnos a atar todos esos cabos sueltos en el derecho probatorio que continúan a ser espacio para el machismo y la violencia. Esperemos que esta corta reflexión mueva a nuestras legisladoras y legisladores así como a nuestras juezas y jueces del Tribunal Supremo a atar los cabos sueltos del machismo en el sistema judicial de Puerto Rico.

[1] Véase la Ley núm. 16 de 1998; RR. 412-413 de Evidencia; Comisión para los Asuntos de la Mujer v. Giménez Muñoz, 109 DPR 715 (1980).

Fortuño, me alegra saber que eres de "esa clase".

2011-02-11T17:14:00.003-04:00

En entrevista radial, el “gobernador” Luis Fortuño señaló acerca de si iba a empobrecer y llevar a la quiebra al Colegio de Abogados, lo siguiente: “Yo voy a coger el dinero que me corresponde. No estoy al tanto de cuánto es. Es lo que me corresponde como cualquier otro abogado que le cobraron de más”.

Además, cuando se le preguntó si lo hará por convicción, sostuvo que “si a ti te cobran de más, tú vas a exigir que te den el dinero que te cobren de más, aunque sean cinco chavos”.

Aquí mi respuesta.

señor “gobernador”:

Permítame decirle que a pesar de que me preocupa sumamente la posibilidad de que el Colegio pierda su sede y de que las abogadas y los abogados del País tengamos que reorganizarnos y repensar una institución que ha servido al pueblo puertorriqueño por más de siglo y medio, me alegra que reconozca que usted es parte de esa clase que procura la desestabilización de la Isla y no de la clase que ha demostrado siempre su compromiso por construir un mejor Puerto Rico. Espero además que al lograr la descolegiación de los abogados y las abogadas nos haya hecho el favor y evitado la vergüenza de tenerlo que contar como colegiado porque es una vergüenza que un alegado togado viole continuamente las protecciones constitucionales de un pueblo, sea deshonesto, un solapado machista, un mentiroso atorrante y encima desconocedor del Derecho. Parece que en la metrópoli no le enseñaron bien el significado de cobrar de más. El Colegio nunca le cobró un centavo de más, siempre le cobró la cuota requerida a toda su matrícula.

El asunto en el pleito Herbert W. Brown v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico es que sus aliados del “tribunal” federal se han inventando una tramoya legal para desarticular el Colegio, una institución que desde su fundación ha estado al servicio del pueblo de Puerto Rico. El Colegio, cumpliendo su llamado de ley y preocupado por los cientos de profesionales que no pueden acceder económicamente a los beneficios que se pueden obtener cuando se trabaja para alguna empresa, utilizaba una porción de la cuota de colegiación para comprar un seguro de vida para beneficio de los familiares que la colegiada o el colegiado designasen. Esto el Colegio lo hizo siempre dentro del marco de la legalidad y siguiendo lo ordenado por la Asamblea Legislativa de nuestro País, aunque los doblegados de la jurisdicción federal digan lo contrario.

La Ley Número 43 de 1932 claramente dispuso en su Artículo 2, inciso H que el Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico tendría la facultad:

para proteger a sus miembros en el ejercicio de la profesión y mediante la creación de montepíos, sistemas de seguro y fondos especiales, o en cualquier otra forma, socorrer aquellos que se retiren por inhabilidad física o avanzada edad y a los herederos o a los beneficiarios que fallezcan.

Más aún, nuestro Tribunal Supremo en los casos de Colegio de Abogados v. Schneider, 117 D.P.R. 504 (1986) y Romero, Hijo v. Colegio de Abogados, 154 D.P.R. 370 (2001) determinó que la utilización por parte del Colegio de una porción de la cuota para fines del pago de un seguro de vida era una actividad legítima y cónsone con la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico y las intenciones de la Asamblea Legislativa del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. Aquí le reproduzco las palaras de nuestro Tribunal, a ver si encuentran hueco en su discurso de la ilegalidad.

El poder correspondiente de asignar una parte de la cuota de membresía a la adquisición del seguro forma parte de la autonomía fiduciaria de la institución, cuya matrícula, reunida en Asamblea Anual, determina la manera de disponer de su presupuesto. Colegio de Abogados v. Schneider II, supra, pág. 514. Nada en la Ley Núm. 43, supra, prohíbe que el Colegio de Abogados haga tal asignación de fondos como medida para instrumentar las facultades que la Ley le confiere, si la Asamblea estima que dicho mecanismo es el más adecuado.

El Colegio de Abogados le ofrece, pues, a sus colegiados una serie de beneficios que se financian, en parte, con el pago de la matrícula. Uno de estos beneficios es la cubierta de seguro de vida que se ofrece a todos los colegiados por igual. El Colegio también ofrece otros beneficios ordinarios no renunciables ni reembolsables, como la Revista del Colegio de Abogados, o de carácter optativo, como una mayor cubierta en el seguro de vida, un seguro de salud, etc. La Ley no limita la discreción del Colegio de hacer la determinación del carácter ordinario u optativo de un beneficio y de los fondos con que ha de sufragarlo.

Esta postura es cónsona con nuestra jurisprudencia. Así, en nuestro anterior pronunciamiento en torno al uso de las cuotas pagadas al Colegio de Abogados, secundamos la voluntad de la Asamblea Legislativa al entender como una legítima asignación de fondos aquella destinada a las actividades comprendidas entre los deberes y funciones de la organización.

Romero, Hijo v. Colegio de Abogados, 154 D.P.R. 370, 380-81 (2001).

Y para que esté mejor informado señor Fortuño, esta disposición de ley aun luego de los ataques de su gobierno a la institución del Colegio sigue vigente. Así, como la interpretación de nuestro Tribunal.

En cumplimiento de esa ley, el Colegio utilizaba una porción de la cuota de colegiación para comprar el seguro de vida que según el “tribunal” federal el Colegio no estaba permitido a proveer a su matrícula. Sin embargo, aun cuando el Colegio si estaba facultado para ello, lo crucial es recordarle señor “gobernador” que el Colegio nunca le cobró a su matrícula (incluido desgraciadamente usted) suma de dinero adicional alguna para pagar las primas del seguro de vida. El seguro se pagó siempre con los dineros de la cuota. De no haber existido el seguro de vida la cuota que se cobraba por la colegiación hubiese sido la misma. Así, que déjeme informarle que nunca le cobraron de más, señor “gobernador”.

Es más señor “gobernador”, me pregunto si la persona que estaría cometiendo un acto ilegal en este caso no sería usted al enriquecerse injustamente al recibir ese dinero que el Colegio desembolsó en beneficio de usted y de su familia. Desconozco si usted nombró algún beneficiario en esa póliza durante los años 2002-2006. Jamás lo sabré, porque, afortunadamente para su familia, éstos no necesitaron acogerse a los beneficios de la cubierta. Dudo además que usted haga pública esa información, así como se niega a hacer pública tantas otras. Sin embargo, yo le haré pública una información muy pertinente. Durante ese periodo, 365 colegiados y colegiadas fallecieron y sus familias recibieron los beneficios del seguro.

No creo que este último dato a usted le preocupe tanto como el recibir del Colegio trescientos y pico de dólares invertidos en su beneficio y en el de su familia. Como sabemos, a usted sólo le importa el bienestar de su familia y de sus “amigos”. Tenemos claro ya que le importa más que la primera dama pueda, sin ser increpada, seguir aumentado la cantidad de cierres hipotecarios que otorga diariamente que el hecho de que en Puerto Rico existen miles de mujeres desempleadas a causa de la Ley 7. No tenemos duda alguna que le importa más que sus hijos e hija asistan a universidades costosas en los Estados Unidos que la posibilidad de que nuestros jóvenes no tengan acceso a una universidad pública y excelente en su país. Y, hoy, confirmamos que le importa más tener un poco más de 300 dólares adicionales en sus bolsillos que la destrucción de una de las instituciones que más sirve a Puerto Rico.

Y añado señor “gobernador”, si usted tuviera principios de verdad no se preocuparía por que le devuelvan 5 centavos que supuestamente le cobraron mal, sino por devolver todo el dinero y las instituciones que ha permitido que sus cómplices le roben al pueblo de Puerto Rico y por garantizar que las futuras generaciones tenga un país suyo y no vendido a y en manos de intereses ajenos.

Sin más,

Aníbal Rosario Lebrón

PD – Hágale llegar a su amigo el señor Fusté la siguiente nota. Fusté, que le quede claro antes de que vaya a solicitar cerrar este blog que yo a pesar de ser miembro del Colegio no soy ni su “agente”, ni su “sirviente”, ni líder alguno dentro del Colegio. Así que a pesar de que estoy seguro que le gustaría mandarme a callar como ilegalmente ha hecho con el Colegio al prohibirle poder informarles a su matrícula y a su País cómo usted y sus compañeros de “estrado” se las ingenian para ultrajarnos, no va a poder. ¡JA!

Para aquellas y aquellos que desean mayor información del pleito y cómo salirse de la clasucha a la que nunca han pertenecido, les dejo estos enlaces.

http://www.yonosoydeesaclase.com/

http://derechoalderecho.org/2011/02/10/no-somos-de-la-clase/

http://impericiamedica.blogspot.com/2011/02/yo-no-soy-de-esa-clase-de-abogado.html

http://www.facebook.com/pages/Yo-no-soy-de-esa-clase/193821880645166

Mes 7

2010-10-24T02:32:00.001-04:00

La estancia hiede a pasado,

a aires a medio respirar.

Las puertas se abren,

pero no reciben a nadie.

En las estanterías:

recuerdos atiborrados.

Brochazos de pintura fresca

enmascaran la sangre.

Cajones vacíos.

Muebles descojonados.

Una historia que al portal

se ha quedado esperando.

Cuerpos torneados

se acumulan en el catre.

En las paredes:

retales de silencio.

El regreso del inverso

no se ha concretado.

La muerte los sorprendió apartados.

Humaredas de esperanza

se arrinconan en las ventanas.

Las piernas fallan.

En la cocina:

cuadros destartalados.

Botellas de ansiolíticos

merodean en el baño.

La vida:

al homólogo se le ha parado.

Mariposas, en el dorso de la mano.

¿La ciudad?

Sin cementerios.

Los signos de una vida sin él
han de ser por siempre ocultados.

Sobre el miedo y la inseguricracia

2010-07-01T23:41:00.001-04:00

Imágenes disidentes en una playa caribeña

2010-06-29T13:26:00.001-04:00

Dos hombres con lengua forasteras

en un atardecer de medio día.

Un lector despreocupado

con ansias a ser fotografiado.

La arena blanca,

y un mar a su lado.

Una ventana de uvas,

un juego al cual no se fue invitado.

El espejismo de un cielo raso.

Bermudas, Santa Lucía, Barbados

Un Alemán multiplicado,

y al lado un Español dominado.

Dos siluetas encueradas

que se pelean lo salado.

Los músculos desdibujados

de dos sexos nivelados.

La calma apacible

de una marea apagada.

Un cuento no inventado

de dos hombres embarbados.

La imagen invertida

de lo que pudo ser el pasado.

Dos hombres que juegan de manos.

¿El lector? Ya ilusionado.

El tedio de no sentirse amado,

mientras siguen los dos hombres de manos.

La apatía a ser delatado.

El temor a un suelo olvidado.

Los dos hombres se han separado.

¿El lector? Ha terminado cansado.

Unos papeles tirados,

la suerte todavía no le ha tocado.

El Alemán multiplicado;

se retiran liberados.

¿El Español? Continua ensimismado.

Fernando…, Ricardo…,¡quién sabe!

Tal vez pudo haber sido Carlos.

Solidario con la UPR

2010-05-24T18:24:00.002-04:00

Espera

2010-05-06T17:41:00.000-04:00

Un hombre espera en la calzada:
de pie y de perfil;
con un cuaderno descuadernado.
Su mirada en un lunes perenne.
Sus pies enraizados en el asfalto.
Entre la pluralidad de pisadas
un corazón hecho estragos.
Sobre sus hombros:
un cielo azul.
¡Límpido!
(en el que su reflejo ni tan siquiera se pierde).
Su piel comprimiéndose al ritmo de una febril inquietud.
Su cuerpo empequeñecido en el presente.
Sus manos atisbadas de deseos y recuerdos.
Y sus labios…
sin poder decir: “Te amo”.

En Pro de la Abolición del Matrimonio Civil

2010-04-26T16:57:00.000-04:00

¿Saludos a todas y todos?

2010-04-15T16:59:00.011-04:00

Mi amigo Humberto hace unos meses posteó en su CaraLibro la siguiente nota:

A todos mis amigos escritores o amantes de la lengua:

El género común es útil, evita pérdidas de tiempo, sintetiza abarcando ambos géneros y ambos sexos. Es más económico decir, cuando traducimos el Evangelio, "dejad que los niños se acerquen a mí" que decir “los niños y las niñas”. Decir, incluso, con Quintiliano que "al niño se le debe máxima reverencia", evidentemente se refiere a niños y niñas. [Francisco Rodríguez Adrados / De las Reales Academias Española y de la Historia, ABC]

Tampoco se acepta la utilización redundante del masculino y del femenino. “La mayor parte de los ciudadanos y de las ciudadanas” es un circunloquio innecesario.

El criterio básico de cualquier lengua es economía y simplificación: obtener la máxima comunicación con el menor esfuerzo posible, no diciendo con cuatro palabras lo que puede resumirse en dos.

Así que parece innecesario ese desdoblamiento indiscriminado del sustantivo en su forma masculina y femenina que se mencionaba al comienzo de este artículo. Algunos van más allá (Francisco Rodríguez Adrados De las Reales Academias Española y de a Historia) y dicen que es tonto e inútil, destroza la economía del lenguaje. Es grotesco.

Una comisión del parlamento andaluz se dirigió a la Real Academia Española (RAE) solicitando un informe sobre la corrección de los desdoblamientos tipo “diputados y diputadas, padres y madres, niños y niñas”, etcétera. La RAE respondió puntualizando que tales piruetas lingüísticas son innecesarias.

El empleo de circunloquios y sustituciones inadecuadas (“diputados y diputadas electos y electas”, en vez de "diputados electos", o llevaré “los niños y las niñas al colegio", en vez de "llevaré los niños al colegio") resulta empobrecedor, artificioso y ridículo. [Arturo Pérez-Reverte / De la Real Academia Española, XLSEMANAL]

Y para condimentar la cosa, algunos prefieren usar la arroba (@), y armar cosas como: "Estimad@s lectores". Pero la arroba no es una letra.

La RAE es clara en este sentido y dice: "Debe tenerse en cuenta que la arroba no es un signo lingüístico y, por ello, su uso en estos casos es inadmisible desde el punto de vista normativo; a esto se añade la imposibilidad de aplicar esta fórmula integradora en muchos casos, sin dar lugar a graves inconsistencias, como ocurre en "Día del niñ@", donde la contracción "del" sólo es válida para el masculino niño.

(Tomado de "De Todo 1 Poco", Uy).

Como reacción yo escribí esta corta reflexión sobre el género y el lenguaje que les comprato hoy:

Creo que no se puede tomar ligeramente este pronunciamiento de la RAE. Y antes de adentrarme en el asunto valga decir que esta “institución” la mayor parte de las veces está en desfase o un paso atrás con lo que las hablantes reconocen como correcto (y no olvidemos que es a las hablantes a quienes les pertenece la lengua y no a una élite de académicas y literatas). Dicho esto, vamos al grano. Estoy de acuerdo en un solo punto con la RAE: leer un texto (o escuchar mensajes) en los que en todo momento que aparece un sustantivo se hace referencia a ambos sexos es un poco tortuoso (“to say the least”) y obstaculiza la lectura. Sin embargo, aseverar que: “El criterio básico de cualquier lengua es economía y simplificación: obtener la máxima comunicación con el menor esfuerzo posible, no diciendo con cuatro palabras lo que puede resumirse en dos”, me parece irresponsable. La lengua como cualquier otra creación humana sirve múltiples propósitos. Que la mayor parte de las veces intentemos sintetizar nuestras comunicaciones no significa que las que no son cortas o económicas no tienen valor alguno o que no merecen ser reconocidas como válidas. ¿O acaso no apreciamos el trabajo de nuestras escritoras precisamente por su extensión y la belleza que logran con ella? ¿Qué diría Gabriel García Márquez si desdeñan su trabajo por ser largo? ¿O Matilde Asensi por abusar de los circunloquios? Lo cierto es que el lenguaje es un instrumento político. Ha sido utilizado para unir reinos, para colonizar pueblos, para subordinar sectores de nuestra población y para dejar a otros sin expresión. Desde hace unos años, sin embargo, ciertos grupos han querido utilizarlo también como un instrumento de liberación y de concientización. Estos grupos han tratado de demostrar la carga ideológica de nuestra lengua y evidenciar que es un instrumento más del patriarcado. A este tan importante reclamo algunas han respondido, que la lengua es neutral, que es un mecanismo de comunicación y que la comunicación debe ser rápida, o que todo esto es un capricho. Pero no es ningún capricho. El lenguaje es la herramienta principal por la cual somos educadas. Las implicaciones que ésta tiene en nuestras vidas y la sociedad no deben ser subestimadas. Por tanto, un reclamo tan vital como la perpetuación del patriarcado a través del lenguaje no puede ser simplemente despachado con un argumento de eficiencia comunicativa. Si nos preocupa la eficiencia comunicativa y reconocemos que el idioma es un instrumento del patriarcado existen varias formas en las que podemos hacer nuestro “statement” político y ser eficientes con el lenguaje al mismo tiempo. En vez de utilizar el masculino como el neutral que incluya tanto al femenino como al masculino podemos utilizar el femenino como la forma neutral. (Notarán que esa fue la estrategia utilizada para este comentario.) También se puede utilizar ambas formas para casos particulares que pretenden negar la gran carga que las mujeres asumen en nuestra sociedad. Por ejemplo, sería indicado en la carta que una estudiante deba llevar a su casa utilizar “las madres y los padres deberán ...” Estas son algunas de las múltiples opciones que aquellas preocupadas con este “issue” han elaborado en las pasadas tres décadas para complacer a todas las personas aun aquellas que su única preocupación es la eficiencia y no la desigualdad que existe en nuestra sociedad. Escudarse tras el argumento que problematizar el género en la lengua sólo entorpece la comunicación o que no es importante porque hay un acuerdo cultural en que todas estamos incluidas en el masculino, lo único que consigue es perpetuar el patriarcado y ensanchar la brecha que separa los sexos en las esferas pública y privada.

N. Rose, Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: Law, Power and the Family, 14 J.L. & Soc’y (1987).

2010-04-13T14:26:00.003-04:00

In Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: Law, Power and the Family Nikolas Rose argues for the adoption of a genealogy of power approach as a tool for analysis in social theory in order to override the inadequacies of the main strategies of study used thus far by radical socialist analysts (historical investigation and power). He draws this approach from the genealogical studies of Foucault and his co-workers. He describes the genealogy of power approach not as a methodology, but as a means of distancing oneself from certain conceptual tools which have a powerful hold over critical thought. He believes that by adopting this new approach radical analysts would stop to see power as the automatic by-product of economic exploitation or social stratification; and power will no longer appear under the guise of denial, control and repression. In addition, the genealogy of power approach would prevent analysts from projecting radical wisdom back into the past and implying that the present can be merely changed by conscious political strategy. To prove his point Rose compares the analysis of the “family” and “family law” done under the strategy of critique with his genealogy of family power.

The critique analysis of the family is centered on understanding the division between public and private spheres. Contemporary legal scholars in U.S. who use this analysis point out that the public/private distinction is one of a number of homologous oppositions – e.g. state/society, right/power, objective/subjective, freedom/coercion – that shape our consciousness and reified our world when incorporated into legal discourse. These dichotomies protect existing hierarchies and delegitimize alternative forms of group solidarity. In the regulation of “family law” this means that “[o]n the one hand, the state, representing dominant males interest, chooses the nature and objectives of public regulation; [while] on the other hand, a domain is constituted outside legal regulation where welfare agencies enforce the ideology of motherhood, and where male power is not even subject to limited protections of the rule of law”. (65) At the same time, the choices of non-intervention of the state which are used as justifications to not intervene are mystified by the public/private dichotomy. Thus, the extent to which the family is a state construct in which the differences in power amongst family members are obscured is never realized. The solution proffered by the critical analysts is to reveal the functions of the dichotomy and its falsity.

Rose, however, believes that albeit being insightful, this critique limits our understanding of the relations between the family and regulatory systems. He argues that this kind of analysis: “fails to grasp the ways in which the private family has, on the one hand, been linked into new forms of political rationality which have developed over the last century, and, on the other hand, has been central to transformations in subjective realities and desires”. (66) Rose thinks this oversimplification can only be overcome if we disrupt the central explanatory categories of the critique.

The first category he takes on is the category of the “law”. Rose argues that the legal system is neither totalized nor enclosed, so there is no unity in the legal practice. The alleged unity is just a creation of legal pedagogy. Hence, it cannot be sustained that family law operates according to an unequivocal construction of the public/private dichotomy. If unities are to be found, Rose contends, they are to be found in terms of outcomes rather than in origin. This, for him, is the key to create a political strategy in relation to law. Likewise, he highlights the importance to look into other systems of regulation[1] such as taxation and welfare; since, “in many cases, analysis of law is the wrong place to start if one wishes to understand regulatory strategies”. (67)

The second category Rose deems should be disrupted is the one of the state. “We should see ‘the state’ not as the origin but as the outcome of … [the] programmes [of regulation]. Rather than seeing an expansion of state control we should seek to analyse what one might term ‘the governmentalisation of the state’: a transformation of what could be governed, by whom and in what ways”. (67) For Rose it is important to recognize that the ideas of how, by whom, and what should be regulate do not emanate from the state but from a diverse array of actors with different interests in mind.

The last category that ought to be re-conceptualized is the one of power. Rose proposes to stop seeing power as having a single subject, a repetitive form, or as an equation in which what is gained by one side is lost by another. Instead, we should conceive power as having multiple sources and multiple mechanisms of which brute domination is the less typical.

If we disturb these categories we would engage in a genealogy of family power approach that would allow us to see that a “familialisation of society” has taken place and that this “familialisation” was created by practices and agencies which are neither private nor organs of political power. Likewise we would recognize that “[the familialisation of society operates because it has managed to command considerable subjective commitment from citizens who have come to regulate their own lives according to its terms”. (68) Thus, if we wish to analyze the forms of subjectification of the family (or any other form of subjectification) from the perspective of power is imperative to free ourselves from the idea that persons are only either agents of oppression or objects of submission.[2] Instead, we must see how all those involved in the regulation of family become tied to a project of creating an identity that binds them not only to one another but also to themselves.

In short, Rose argues for the abandonment of the path of traditional critical analysis since its tools of illusion, mystification and false consciousness preclude us from understanding the processes abovementioned and from grasping how regulation truly operates and relations of power are installed in society. Breaking with the tradition of critique, Rose sustains, would make visible a complex set of practices and power relations that require posing questions of judgment that cannot be answered by the political slogans that underlie critical analysis. Briefly, Rose’s paper is the application of the governmentality framework to the specific “problem of family law”.

[1] This contention underlies one of the basic assumptions of governmentality which is that government should be understood in an extended sense in which all the interdictions, urgings, interventions, techniques and evaluations which seek to shape up events towards desired ends are included as part of the idea of government.

[2] This embraces the basic premise of Foucault that governmental power is not “objectifying” but “subjectifying”.

Feely on Nonet & Selznick's Law and Society in Transition

2010-04-12T14:48:00.002-04:00

In Law, Legitimacy and Symbols: An Expanded View of Law and Society in Transition, Malcolm Feely reviews Nonet & Selznick book entitled Law and Society in Transition. He begins by stating that the book is part of an ongoing agenda of the authors to celebrate the rule of law. In this 1978 book, the authors proposed a theory of the development of varying types and stages of legality by positing three modes of legal order: responsive law, autonomous law and responsive law. These modes differ in their purpose, method and source of legitimacy. The authors contend that these modes are only ideal types, and any legal order has a mix of all three of them. Feely summarizes these three modes of legal order in the following manner.

	Repressive Law	Autonomous Law	Responsive Law
Purpose	Primitive need for order and social defense; Consolidate authority; Command obedience; Legitimize political power	To tame repression; To develop a government based on laws	Concern with substance
Method	Coercion; Brute Force	Celebrates the rule of law; Emphasis on procedures; Challenges are ought to be made through the established legal institutions	Fidelity to the substantive aims of the law; Focus on principles within the law; Laws are open-textured
Source of Legitimacy	Only through the use of efficient force can security and morality be preserved	Law (The government of laws and not of men)	Justice*
Relation to Politics	Subordinated to politics	Separation of law and politics	Integral part of government and politics^*
Philosophical Perspectives	Hobbes, Austin & Marx	Kelsen	Roscoe Pound; Dworkin; Dewey

Nonet & Selznick contend that these modes of legal order arise in some sort of an evolutionary scheme. The “first stage” in this scheme is the repressive, follow by the autonomous, and the culmination being the responsive mode. They envision an inner dynamic in which certain conditions within each model generate a pressure for change which at the end produces the “developmental sequence” described above.

Feely makes several critiques to this theory of Nonet & Selznick. First, he points out that the logic and the dynamic of the evolutionary model is not very convincing. His critique stems from the following reasons:

1. There is no evidence to prove that the three stages occur in any sequence.

2. The authors diminish the role of the external social forces that shape the law and might contribute to changes in the type of legal order.

3. It seems more likely that Nonet & Selznick have identified different elements of all legal systems that exist in perpetual tension rather than stages of development of legal systems.

4. Temporary saliency of the modes cannot be confused with distinct stages.

5. It is not clear that the developmental sequence can be applied to all periods in history or only to a specific period of time.

6. The model seems to be focused mainly on judicial decisions in common law jurisdictions.

7. Law is too diverse and amorphous to seriously sustain any dominant mode.

The second critique made by Feely to Nonet & Selznick is that is not clear at what “level” their analysis is to be applied. In other words, Feely wishes to highlight that it cannot be discerned whether the authors’ focus is on substance, style or neither.

Furthermore, Feely argues that the main concern for Nonet & Selznick is law and legitimacy. Based on this premise, Feely asserts that the authors should have reflected more extensively on the use of symbols in public life. For this point, Feely draws on Lasswell’s thesis that political legitimacy depends not only on the actions of the government, but also on the successful presentation of symbols. He also draws on the ideas of Edelman, who sustains that a successful political analysis rests on two dimensions: 1. how political actions are used to acquire tangible things from the government; and 2. the meaning of these actions to the mass public and how the former are placated by the public. Feely contends that this kind of analysis also holds for socio-legal analysis.[1] And since Nonet & Selznick lack this kind of analysis, the value of their work is seriously diminished. By failing to sketch the expressive and symbolic level as well as the instrumental and practical analysis, Nonet & Selznick also fail to make problematic the relation of legal legitimacy to actual legal practice and its disjuncture, which for Feely should be the main focus of their inquiry.

On the other hand, even though Feely asserts that he does not believe a developmental theory about law is impossible, he attacks Nonet & Selznick’s model by saying they are given a theory of moral development rather than an explanation on the evolutionary nature of the spirits of the laws. By so doing, Nonet & Selznick make themselves susceptible to the objections that are usually made to reification and teleological explanation. In addition, Feely argues that their inquiry, by being centered on moral developmental, is self referential and apolitical. Even more, their analysis is shortsighted since it does not look for external social conditions that might contribute to the changes in law. All of these problems make their effort, even though praiseworthy, a failure.

Feely ends his review by stating that he believes that what Nonet & Selznick were trying to do was to understand the normative appeals of institutions of social control in modern complex societies. However, their analysis instead of being a law and society inquiry is directed at the moral appeals of political authority. Yet, their work lacks a developed political dimension which is needed to embark in the real analysis they were making, the political authority analysis.

* Feely does not give an account of these features in his review Nonet & Selznick’s book.

[1] It is interesting to note that even though Feely sustains this view he at the end of his review states that Nonet & Selznick’s work is not socio-legal but rather that is political.

Visit to Family Court

2010-04-12T14:38:00.000-04:00

My visit to the New York County Family Court was an interesting experience in two aspects. First, I found the visit to be a very enriching experience in terms of the opportunity that gave me to compare how different jurisdictions organize their judiciary to attend what they consider to be a particular kind of conflicts under the rubric of Family Law and also to contrast how they treat the privacy concerns that arise in such kind of cases. Second, I had the opportunity to hear a peculiar case of custody, which exemplified how some hegemonic discourses are so deeply ingrained in the decisions that are taken in family courts but at the same time illustrated how the lives of the persons affected by those decisions is so far removed from those hegemonic discourses and how the law sometimes is just a complication rather than a solution for “family matters”.

Although I knew already that in New York juvenile courts where under the specialized family courts, it was still a surprise for me to see quasi criminal process to take place under the rubric of family court. Since, in Puerto Rico the juvenile courts operate like a criminal court, I expected that the proceedings in New York which take place in family court differed more from the criminal proceeding and embodied a spirit more in tune with the kind of processes that take place in family courts. I thought that was the reason for having these proceedings in the Family Court. Yet, the proceedings in the 4^th floor of the New York County Family Court were much like the ones I used to be part of in the criminal courts in Puerto Rico. There was no major difference that allowed me to make the connection between family and juvenile courts.

The prosecution and the legal aid lawyers were talking among themselves without any contact with the clients who were being brought into court by police officers, a lot of rescheduling took place in the courtroom, and a disinterested judge kept moving cases along. The only difference was that since we were in a Family Court which had a waiting area for the parties, in the courtroom the only ones present were the persons involved in the case like in family proceedings. Although it was really interesting that the only thing I had to do in order to gain access to the courtroom was to talk to the bailiff and say I was a NYU student. Especially since in Puerto Rico family court proceedings are closed and persons like me can only be admitted into the hearing if the parties agree to it. This was not for me a major concern with the juvenile proceedings, since it is a quasi criminal proceeding and there is a strong public interest recognized by the Supreme Court in that citizens oversee that the courts are working properly. But it was a major surprise when I went to hear a custody proceeding.

The bailiff in the custody proceeding did not even mention to me that I should not make any reference to the name of the parties in my paper, like the bailiff in the juvenile court did. Even more, the judge hearing the custody case, after she dismissed the parties and dispose of the petitions, filled me in with all the details of the case. I believe she wanted to justify to me her decision in the case. Perhaps, my face of confusion and astonishment led her to obviate the rules established to preserve the privacy of the parties. Nonetheless, I profited from the opportunity and asked a couple of questions to the judge in order to understand better her position.

The case was about two siblings who were in the custody of their grandmother who passed away recently this year. Their uncle filed a petition for custody and the dad of their 20 years old half-brother did too. This last man who did not have any biological connection with the children was supporting them economically since the uncle had to leave his job in order to take care of the children and his mother who was dying of cancer and he was involved in the life of the children since they used to visit their half-brother often. However, the children who are living with his uncle had expressed that they want the things to stay the way they were and that they had concerns with being under the custody of their half-brother’s father.

During the hearing the attorney for the half-brother’s dad stated that the parts had agreed to have a joint custody. However, the uncle who was representing himself stated clearly that his only concern was the children and that they had expressed that they would like for things to stay the same. Yet the uncle seemed inclined to agree with the other party filing for custody because of his unemployed status. The mother, who was also at the hearing, perhaps as an interested party, did not want either for the current situation to change. The attorney assigned for the children, who did not seem to care much about any of the arguments that were being presented in court, only remitted herself to the report in which the children said they did not want things to change. Thus, the hearing was basically a discussion between the judge and the attorney of the half-brother’s dad, who was not able to posit any legal reason for which the joint custody was to be granted. The judge, on the other side, was concern with raising a total stranger to a level of the mother (who did not ask for custody) or to that of a biological relative (as the uncle). So she decided not to grant the petition for the half-brother’s dad and grant the one filed by the uncle, even though he was unemployed at the moment. The idea that permeated her reasoning in court was the hegemonic idea of the biological family. Yet, when she dismissed the parties and talked to me, her major concern was not the non compliance with the biological family model (although it was in fact part of her reasoning), but the unsettling feeling that a legal change which was not supposed to alter the current situation of the children could disrupt the relationships between the adults and in turn affect the children.

At the end, the visit at the Family Court confirmed my intuition that most of the issues that are heard in family court and/or that are within the regulation of Family law are best solved taking into considerations extra-legal factors and disregarding the hegemonic discourses embedded in the law.

Democracy and Judicial Review

2010-04-12T01:42:00.001-04:00

Over the past century, the language and the practice of rights have taken prominence in political discourse especially in liberal democratic societies. Important battles have been fought to set out the limits of state intervention and to determine what citizens can and cannot do in their public and private lives. A great number of these battles have been resolved not in the political arena of legislatures and/or electoral races, but in the courts by means of judicial review. Concerns about the democratic nature of this practice of judicial review and its legitimacy have been raised. Some thinkers, like Jeremy Waldron, sustain that judicial review of rights should not be part of a democratic government, since judicial review is an undemocratic practice. Yet, others like Mattias Kumm, think exactly the opposite: that judicial review is compatible with democratic legitimacy; and moreover, that a democracy without it is deficient.

Waldron sustains that in order to evaluate the democratic value of judicial review we should refrain from looking to the fact of how well this practice does in producing good outcomes. He sustains democratic value cannot be found in the outcomes, but in the process of how the decisions over rights are taken and who is taking those decisions. He argues that even if judicial review produces good outcomes, the practice is undemocratic and politically illegitimate since: 1. it does not provide for a way to society to focus in the real issues at stake when citizens disagree about rights; and 2. it privileges a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges over a voting majority. Kumm, on the other hand, defends judicial review when it incorporates the proportionality test, since the incorporation of this test represents for him the incorporation of democratic values. Yet, Kumm seems to be in accordance with Waldron main contention that the test of legitimacy and democracy is one that should be done with disregard to the fact that the practice of judicial review produces or not good outcomes. Before one can evaluate in depth Kumm and Waldron’s proposals and highlight where their arguments fail, I believe to be necessary first to consider the soundness of this point of convergence between the two of them.

I do not agree with theses two thinkers in that judicial review as a practice should be evaluated on terms of its democratic value without taking into consideration the results it produces. I believe that in order to weight its democratic value, we should consider how well judicial review does in producing good outcomes as well as how democratic the process of deciding rights through judicial review is. Although Waldron seems to be worried about a system producing bad outcomes when it comes to deciding rights, he seems to think that these “rare instances” in which rights are erroneously appointed or wrongly unrecognized are endemic to the democratic process and should not be taken into account unless its occurrence becomes pathological. For him, outcomes do not contribute to the democratic process. However, this approach obviates one of the central pillars of democracy, consent. As Kumm rightly points out, consent, and not majorities, is the base for democracy in contemporary liberal democratic societies.

If we take this to be truth, then we should agree on the contention that people consents to enter into a democratic government as long as certain rights which they deem essential and have written down in a document like a Bill of Rights are respected and enforced. In fact, minorities acquiesce to enter into a government directed by the wishes of the majority precisely because they have, in this system, for their protection against the tyranny of the majority the agreement over the recognition of certain rights. Yet, for this to work, the agreement over rights requires that mechanisms be put into place to assure that the decisions of the majority are kept within the limits of the recognized rights. Otherwise, the consent of the minorities would not be truly a consent since an essential part for forming that consent is lacking. Thus, if mechanisms to constrain the actions of the electoral majority with regards to the decision-making process over rights are absent, then the democratic enterprise would crumble down, and the system should be considered undemocratic. This means, that the outcomes of the decision-making process over rights should be taken into account when evaluating its democratic value.

Since rights are usually open texture and institutions which are based on the votes of the majority of the electoral population can override easily the agreement over the rights and/or obviate without much problem the justifications recognized under the democratic system to restrict the meaning of a particular right, we need an institution and/or a procedure that can guarantee that those rights and those justifications are observed. Judicial review does exactly that work. Indeed, what judicial review does best is: it reduces the instances in which, using the terminology of Richard Wollheim, the “paradox of democracy” occurs. In other words, the job of the judges vested with the responsibility of judicial review is to assure that the consent of the minorities is not being diminished by the actions of the electoral majority. They are able to do so by making reference to the document which collects the rights deemed as essential in their open texture form and by evaluating if the justification for limiting the meaning of the rights has been followed. By so doing, judicial review contributes to the preservation of democracy in a liberal democratic society.

At the same time, judicial review is a legitimate democratic institution since it is created by the majority of the voters. First, the majority of the voters have consented to create an institution/procedure that assures that the rights they have recognized as vital will not be violated. Second, they have agreed on a mechanism to select the ones who are called to guarantee this democratic safeguard. Third, they elect the persons who will nominate and eventually select the officers who will be responsible for engaging in judicial review. Fourth, before judicial review takes place the majority of the electorate is able to enforce their particular meaning for a right through the legislative process. Finally, the majority of the voters are represented also during the process of judicial review and their reasons for implementing determinate meaning of a right are heard and considered by the judges.

Thus, the process of judicial review retains in every stage a compromise to democracy not only by respecting consent but also by acknowledging the important role the decisions of the majority play in a democracy. Likewise it is democratic since the judges – because of their process of appointment – also hold democratic credentials as the legislators do. That they are not of the same degree as the legislators, as Waldron points out, is true. But a democracy does not require that all the persons making decisions over rights should hold the same democratic credentials. What a democracy requires is that the persons making the decisions over rights hold the appropriate democratic credentials for the task they have been assigned and that democratic safeguards exists in all the stages of the process. Judges hold the necessary democratic credentials to do their job of judicial review. In addition, judicial review offers all the safeguards required by the democratic ideals of consent and decisions by a majority. Thus, it is a mistake not to include the outcome component as part of the democratic assessment of judicial review, as both Kumm and Waldron do. Yet, the greatest mistake is to sustain, as Waldron does, that judicial review is an undemocratic practice when it is an institution/procedure that embodies the most precious democratic ideals recognized as such in contemporary liberal democratic societies.

marzo-abril

2010-04-07T07:27:00.010-04:00

Tengo un bruxismo en vilo.
Un espera hecha trizas.

El fin de la novena
se precipita inexorable.

Mis ojos fragmentados
sólo encuentran remiendo
en la compañía de tus despalabras.

Mi sexo desolado devora el espacio

entre nuestros mundos.

He aceptado la derrota.

Es hora de tirar los peces salados a la acera.

Las líneas de mis manos

han torcido rumbo.

¡Feliz Pascua! Buona Pasqua! Feliz Pascoa! Happy Easter!

2010-04-04T09:17:00.002-04:00

On the Duty to Obey the Law

2010-03-08T04:00:00.002-04:00

The question of the existence of a duty to obey the law is an interrogative that has troubled philosophers, legal scholars and activists for centuries. For instance, Plato made reference to this problem in the dialogue between Crito and Socrates. The answer for Socrates was clear: there is such a duty to obey the law.[1] The arguments contained in this dialogue have been refined by later philosophers such as a Locke, Rawls and Hart. However, a consensus about the existence of a duty to obey the law and/or about the grounds for such a duty has not yet been attained.

In fact, M.B.E. Smith in his essay entitled Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? proves that such duty cannot be derived from the arguments philosophers have posited thus far. Smith disproves the existence of the assertion of such a duty by showing that such a general principle cannot be derived from any of the three major arguments presented thus far in philosophy: the benefits for the State or fair play argument, the implicit consent argument and the utilitarian argument. I agree with Smith that the reasons posited by the philosopher thus far do not justify the existence of a duty to obey the law or the inexistence of an exception to this alleged obligation. However, all he does is to demonstrate that such a general principle or duty cannot be asserted from those reasons. That does not imply that there is not such a duty and/or that such a duty cannot have exceptions to it.

The failure to effectively prove or disprove that there is a duty to obey the law lies, I believe, in the starting point of the discussion. The attempts to prove or disprove the existence of this duty depart from the duty itself and not from the breakage of that duty which is a reality recognized by every legal system. In fact, all legal systems are structured to cope with a substantial amount of disobedience and only in rare instances is disobedience meaningful for the stability of the legal order. Thus, I deem the first question to be asked in order to derive a justification for the duty to obey the law to be: to what type of (dis)obedience are we referring when we speak of (dis)obedience to the law in terms of duty or moral obligations?

Definitely is not about the mere infractions that go unnoticed and unpunished, since they do not represent any threat to the legal system and above all are unknown. Neither it’s about the many “illegal acts” for which the legal system does not offer a sanction, given that they are not consider of any worth by the legal order itself. Nor it’s about the infractions that are punished but do not create any socio-political or legal instability since they are properly dealt by the mechanisms the legal system have put into place. Hence, when we are talking about disobeying the law in terms of a duty we are referring to cases to which the legal system has assigned a legal sanction, are publicly either punished or unpunished, and create some sort of disruption to the socio-political and legal life. The best example of such acts is civil disobedience. Thus, a serious attempt to elucidate the justifications for the existence of a duty to obey the law stems from the study of civil disobedience.

However, when philosophers or activists have started to consider the issue of the existence of a duty to obey the law by looking into the phenomenon of civil disobedience they have inevitably fell in the trap of elaborating their arguments around the duty itself. As Smith accurately points out in his aforementioned essay, the writers who have embarked in this conversation in this manner have claimed that civil disobedience is a last resource mechanism when the derogation of an unjust law and legal transformation are sought. By making civil disobedience contingent to the unjust law they have claimed a priori the obligation of obeying the law without considering what insights can be derived from studying civil disobedience in isolation. At the same time, they have foreclosed the door for having a fruitful conversation with others that do not share the same conception of the law, like the positivists who think that laws can be unjust.[2]

Even though the question of the nature of the law is distinct from the question of the existence of a duty to obey the law, when the latter is sought to be answered in reference of the duty itself both questions tend to be conflated. For instance, Martin Luther King, in trying to explain why he participated in the Birmingham campaign and why it was not morally reprehensible that he engaged in act of disobedience of the law, asserts as one of the reasons for his actions that the law he was disobeying was an unjust one, and since “unjust laws are not law” given that only laws “that squares with the moral law or with the law of God” are indeed law he had the moral responsibility to disobey the law. This account reflects how conflated the duty of obeying the law can get with the nature of the law if the reasons for understanding the duty comes from an analysis of the duty itself and not from the study of its defiance. Being these two questions, in an analysis like that, so conflated, a conversation about the duty to obey the law with a party who has a different conception of the law will not allow for a true engagement in the elucidation of the nature of that obligation.

On the other hand, if we structure our analysis from the disobedience of the law we will be able to come up with a language that would serve positivist as well as not positivist to explain this apparent moral obligation of obeying the law and its apparent exceptions. For instance, isolating civil disobedience in the analysis would permit to realize that disobedience to the law is a mechanism by which legal systems get transformed. Thus, disobedience in some instances would be deemed necessary. Likewise, it would serve to see that a claim of the existence of a principle or a duty to obey the law without any exceptions would represent a political claim for the maintenance of the status quo. It would also demonstrate that such strict conception of the duty to obey the law would not recognize its dynamic nature. These general principles can be fit well into the different conceptions thus far developed in philosophy and aid the different camps in their attempts to explain the nature of the duty to obey the law.

[1] Socrates substantiated his answers in various grounds. First, he argued that to live the good life means to live following the law. Thus, obedience to the law is a higher moral obligation than any other that can be posited to disobey the law. Second, Socrates asserted that the benefits we derive from the State, our continuance to enjoy them and our unwillingness to abandon the State that is giving us such benefits oblige us to follow the rules by which we are governed. Otherwise, we would be contributing to the destruction of the legal system, and in turn of the State from which we have profited and whose is sustained by the legal system we are aiding to destroy. Last, Socrates stressed that disobedience to the law cannot be justified in the attainment of a good or in the existence of injustice within the law, since an injustice to remedy an injustice is not just. Or as the popular saying goes: two wrongs never make one good.

[2] This should not be constructed as a claim that positivists argue for a blindly obedience to the laws if they were legitimately enacted. In fact, this cannot be said since for the positivists the question of the duty to obey the law is distinct from the question of the nature of the law.

The EU & the Rule of Recognition

2010-03-02T21:10:00.002-04:00

The emergence of the European Union and of its judicial organ, as well as the further development of an extensive regulation scheme for the member States, have created through the years a growing tension between the National law of the Member States and European law. This tension has manifested itself in various manners. For instance, questions about what is the supreme law to be applied in concrete cases and about which is the organ entitled to determine such supreme law and/or its validity have been raised by legal scholars as well as by the Justices of various of the ultimate courts of the Member States. Yet, the approaches posited thus far to deal with this conflict have proven to be insufficient. The reason for such failure is that these approaches have disregarded for the most part the underlying reason for the conflict, namely the change in the rule of recognition that took place with the emergence of the European Union. Once jurists recognize that as the basic problem, they will be able to elucidate successfully the new rule of recognition which in turn holds the key to resolve the tension between National and European law.

The failure to deal with the real issue at stake is present in the simplest approaches developed to deal with the issue as well as in the more complex formulations. For instance, the simplest approaches – under which either the National or the European law is chosen to be the supreme law[1] – have disregarded the fact that what has created the growing tension between the National Courts and the European Court of Justice is precisely the incapacity of the Courts to accept that the creation of the European Union precipitated a change in the rule of recognition in the legal systems of the Member States which needs to be elucidated. For example the arguments made for the adoption of the NCS approach has been that NCS has been the practice in the Nation States members of the European Union. Yet, this reasoning does not recognize the fact the ultimate rule of recognition can be changed by the legal actors as it indeed happened with the creation of the European Union. Another argument that has been posited to further both the NCS and the ECS is whether it can be asserted that an European demos in fact does exist and that this constituent power has established a new rule of recognition, namely the ECS. This reasoning is feeble – even though it might be able to accommodate concerns with the rule of recognition – since it relies on the notion that the emergence or existence of an European demos would inevitably mean the selection by the citizens of the Member States of the ECS approach and the non existence of such a demos would imply the selection of the NCS approach. But this is a fallacy since both approaches can be sustained under either scenario. Thus, the capacity for accepting a change in the rule of recognition and its latter elucidation are hampered by the a priori conceptions embedded in the models.

Another approach posited to resolve the issue between National and European law has been the use of the Principle of Best Fit. Under this approach, neither ECS nor NCS applies; rather courts are called to construct an adequate relationship between the European and the National law by looking into the underlying principles of both regulations. This approach is focused on the content of the regulation rather than on a principle of decision-making free from the content of the law. Hence, the Principle of Best Fit does not attend the real issue behind the conflict between National and European law, namely the confusion or lack of certainty with regards to the ultimate rule of recognition. Yet, professor Kumm asserts that the Principle of Best Fit is a good starting point to a possible solution which he designates with the name “Constitutionalism Beyond the State” (CBS).

CBS is an approach which tries to move away from the binary choices of the ECS or NCS, as the Principle of Best Fit does. Yet, unlike the Principle of Best Fit the CBS goes beyond the examination and weighing of the underlying principles of National and European Law. The approach is basically an approach of conflict of laws that takes into account as restricting factors on the primary analysis principles of legality, jurisdiction, subsidiarity and procedural principles of democracy. Although this approach seems to be a very practical solution to the issue of conflict between National and European Law, I am not sure it tackles with the real issue: the uncertainty with regards to the ultimate rule of recognition under the European Law supranational regulation; or if it does, it should do it explicitly since to a great extent it is dependent on the content of the laws at issue. It also conflates the questions about what is the supreme law to be applied in concrete cases and about which is the organ entitled to determine such supreme law and/or its validity, which in reality are not tied and should be answer separately in order to come up with a theoretical framework that can serve better the courts to solve the current conflicts they are facing.

Thus, I would argue for a framework which posits explicitly the conflict between National and European law as a problem in determining the rule of recognition. Yet, I do believe the rule of recognition after the creation of European Union does not necessarily have to be constructed as vertical one. Indeed, I think the problem in determining the rule thus far has been precisely the insistence on constructing the rule of recognition in vertical formulation, which leads to binary choices. The problem of conflict between European and National law can be solved by removing the uncertainty about a rule of recognition and by realizing and accepting that indeed a change in the rule of recognition took place with the emergence of the European Union. That change has produced a more complicated configuration in the rule of recognition, which in the best speculation has both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The rule of recognition must also include restrictions based on principles shared by both the Union and National legal systems, which permits their successful integration and interaction. Finally, I believe that this new rule of recognition does not say anything with regard to the organ entitled to determine the validity of the norms under the ultimate rule of recognition. In fact, both the National Courts and the European Court of Justice should have the capacity of make such determinations and apply the rule of recognition to the cases they hear.

[1] Professor Mattias Kumm has designated these approaches as the National Constitutional Supremacy (NCS) and the European Constitutional Supremacy (ECS) respectively.

¡Anímate!

2010-02-25T12:56:00.003-04:00

Acércate.

Enséñame a leer tus carnes.

Echa tus nasas y recoge las rocas de mi estanque.

Desnúdame,

que tengo ansias de permanecer impávido en la bruma de tus labios;

de encender el candil de tus brazos;

de añejarme entre tus palpitantes manos.

Revélate.

Espera la llovizna de la madrugada.

Siéntate a mi lado.

Afina el barullo de tus tiernas nalgas.

Quítate los zapatos.

Moldea el roce de mi cintura en tu espalda.

Obsérvame callado.

Hazme alcoba en los bejucos de tu falda.

Convídame a un sorbo de tu concupiscencia.

Olvida los trastes.

Enfilemos las naves.

Derribemos estantes.

Sudemos los efímeros amores del pasado.

Ven.

Templa el monte recién nacido del deseo.

¡Qué el alba ya reencarna!

Ven.

Inunda mi silencio

con tu cachonda fragancia a naranja.

Ven.

Dormitemos apretujados.

Desvelemos las ganas.

Dispénsame un arrechucho más allá de la incandescencia de mis muslos.

Redescubramos el arcano recelo.

Tras del monzón,

persistamos yuxtapuestos;

taciturnos en el lecho de nuestros jugos.

¡Anímate!

Esta noche,

no tiene otro rumbo

que el domicilio de nuestros cuerpos.

Un deseo de San Valentín

2010-02-14T23:51:00.000-04:00

So Little to Cry About

2010-02-08T12:26:00.005-04:00

“no sé si todo pasa en este instante o si ya pasó

o si siempre está pasando.”

Reinaldo Arenas

He cannot forget that night, even if he wanted to. The sky was so dark. The room was so cold. His fingers were burning with fear. His eyes were claiming for a second chance. And in front of him there were so many memories. Memories that still today linger and chat with him, so that he can be guided, warned and counseled. He knows is not damnation. He is sure it is a gift. Yet, so many nights he had wished he could weep like he used to. So many times, he had hoped his mother had not died. Still, he longs for more than two tears.

He craves for the embrace of his mother Libertad. He desperately wishes to feel the caress she never gave him since she did not want to plant weaknesses into his soul. All he has are two tears kept in the deepest place underneath the ball of his eyes. He cannot cry. Nevertheless, he can feel how those two lonely tears that burn the inside of his eyes battle each day with the dryness of his life, just like the water pouring down from the showerhead battles with the dryness of his bare skin.

He knows the water is warm. He can imagine it. Yet it feels as cold as the east wind that announced the birth of his only child. Well . . . So he thought that night. He was walking down the street; leaves were falling from the trees; and a rain of stars was brightening the night. Suddenly, it started raining. He wasn’t sure, but he could swear it hadn’t rained since the night his mother passed away. That was ten years ago. After all, it was Deadpan. People are used to not to see rain so often. Perhaps, precisely that was what made water so magical when he was growing up.

III

He did not have an umbrella. But it didn’t bother him either. For most of his life he has loved to be soaked under the rain. It was his favorite pastime when he was a kid and did not live in Deadpan: to play with his mother under the rain. It was her who taught him how important water was. But those days were short-lived. His father’s return when he was six forced them to move to Deadpan. He did not know anyone. Nor could he play with water anymore, because there was none.

The only time he did see water besides coming from some strange object in the kitchen or in the bathroom that he hadn’t seen before in his life since in his old house they didn’t have any of those mysterious objects that you touch and water comes out of it as it was coming from the sky was when his mother was crying. He used to watch her cry. He used to stand for hours in secret in a tree outside the window of his mother’s bedroom and watch her cry like the sky under a storm. He did not understand why his mother was crying. He did not understand it when he was six. Neither when he was eight. But at nine, he did get it. He comprehended why his mother didn’t like to go out, why she cried, why she prayed so often, why she was so scared and why she didn’t caress him unless he pretended to be asleep.

He was walking home from school that day. He had finished his day early so he decided to play around the dry fountain at the plaza. He didn’t expect to see his dad, even less to see him coming from the house of his second grade teacher. He decided to hide; he didn’t want to be seen or to be punished. He skipped school all week after seeing his dad with Mrs. Rivero. And he went down to the plaza every day until he saw his father entering Mrs. Rivero’s house one more time. He moved near to the house and spied on them.

He was so sad. He could not remember to be so sad in his life before. Not even when he had to leave his old house in Sabbia (he knew it was for the better). But he didn’t say anything that day he had to move to Deadpan, neither the day he saw his father cheating on his mother, not the day his mother died, not even the day his own daughter was born. He kept in silence as he was taught.

He was walking down the street; leaves were falling from the trees; a rain of stars was brightening the night; and suddenly it started raining. That was the night his daughter was born. He wasn’t sure, but he could swear it hadn’t rained since the night his mother passed away. That was ten years ago. And then again, ten years ago he was walking down the street; leaves were falling from the trees, a rain of stars was brightening the night, and suddenly it started raining. He wasn’t sure, but he felt it was the right thing to do. He hadn’t seen his mother since he was twenty and told her she had fucked his life.

He still feels the emptiness of that evening, the sorrow he suffered because of the lack of understanding of his mother. He wasn’t accusing her of being a bad mother. He knew how much she loved him. He just wanted her to know how he felt. He just wanted to explain her why he became hard as rock, why he wasn’t any more like water pouring from the skies. He wanted her to realize she made a mistake getting back with his dad, by forgiving him after his dad told her that he had cheated on her in more than three different occasions. He just wanted to be hold close, understood. He just wanted to cry beside his mother as he imagined he was doing when he watched her from the tree outside the window of her bedroom.

But Libertad did not understand his cry for help. She did not want him to cry by her side. She wanted for him a better life. That was the reason why they moved from Sabbia, from their poor house in the countryside where it rained every day. She wanted him to have a father by his side, not to grow loveless, without a father figure. She did not want to see him grow all by himself. That is why she kept on forgiving his father. That is why she coped with the gossip, with a child outside the marriage, and with all the unhappiness. She did not foresee that he would not remain as fluidly as water. Neither did she foresee that she was to become a hard rock also.

But she became one. Since he was six he hadn’t heard his mother told him how much she loved him. He did not see anyone showing affection for another person. All he can remember are tears. The same tears he saw falling over the wooden floor of his mother’s house in Deadpan the night he came back to her house. The same tears he shed over the bed of his dying mother. The same tears that smelled like roses and butterflies.

When he entered her room he was well aware of that smell. The smell of roses and butterflies. His mother was crying the same tears she cried the day she was born. But it had passed forty-nine years since that day in which Libertad first saw the light. It had passed twenty-six years since she shed again those tears that smell like pink and yellow roses and monarch butterflies. It had passed twenty-six years since he was born. He knew the story. He had heard it like a thousand times. The day his mother came into the world she came crying. Nobody knew the reason, but she was crying. And her tears smelled like roses in the morning. Like roses celebrating life, love and freedom. That’s why her mother, doña Barbara, decided to name her Libertad because she smelled like roses celebrating life, love and freedom. She had only celebrated with those same kinds of tears two times in her life, the day of her birth and the day of the birth of his only child. And she had only shed those same kinds of tears three times in her life, the day of her birth, the day of the birth of his only child and the day of her death.

VII

But on that third time she was not celebrating. At least, that was what her son thought. No one was being born. To the contrary, she was dying. But, she has being dying since the day he left. However, he didn’t know that. All he knew was that her mother was alone, that her father abandoned her for another woman four years after he left, and that she has been suffering from cancer for the last two months. That was all he knew; the only details the neighbors from his mother have told him. That was the reason he came back, because she was dying.

But he couldn’t say anything. All he did was to sit down by her side, keep silence and cry. Cry like he had wanted for so long. Cry like she had never allowed him. Cry by her side and with her, as he did as child. But this time he had tears. Yet, they were crying for different reasons. Libertad was crying out of relive, out of understanding. She has come to terms with herself and with his son. But he was crying out of sorrow, out of desperation. He was crying because she was leaving him alone. Or so he thought. . .

His tears came from a place of regret, from a place of anger. His tears came from his mind not from his heart. A fire surrounded his tears. A fire that destroyed the floor and left naked the ground that was holding the house. A ground that have the exact color of Libertad’s eyes. Of those same eyes that had shed two times before tears with the smell of roses and butterflies. The two same eyes he saw when he was twenty and he left his house. The same two eyes that were now building a lake under Libertad’s bed.

VIII

He was all soaked because of his mother’s tears and his own. But it didn’t bother him. He was playing in that little lake his mother and he were making as if he was six again. It was his favorite pastime when he was a kid and didn’t live in Deadpan, to play with his mother under the rain, to be soaked. It was her who taught him how important water was. But in those days his tears were not as hot as the flame of the burners of the stove in his old house at Deadpan. His tears didn’t destroy the skin of his mother like the meat cutters she used to prepare the food for him and his dad. His tears didn’t kill anyone, not even his father whom he wished many times dead. It has passed two decades since he remember shedding any tears. And after two decades his tears have became deadly weapons, stove burners and meat cutters that were killing his mother.

As each drop of his tears fell over Libertad’s body her flesh became liquefied. Every cell transformed itself at the touch of his son’s tears in a little salty drop of water that smelled like pink and yellow roses and monarch butterflies. Libertad was becoming a big splash of tears that fused with his son’s in the lake over the naked floor of the house. His son wasn’t horrified at the sight. But he couldn’t understand why his mother was becoming a body of water after being a rock for so many years.

He wasn’t mesmerized, but he was confused. He could see himself as a kid in every little drop that was falling from the bed. And he realized his childhood was pouring down from the sky of Libertad’s bed to the little salty lake that smelled like pink and yellow roses and monarch butterflies on the naked floor of his old house at Deadpan. Suddenly, he saw himself in the lake reading his science books and wondering how it was possible that to be made up of three fourths of water and yet be so solid. And he pondered as he did as a child why if his dad was also made up of such a kindhearted liquid that allows the creation and continuity of life he was so cruel toward his mother. And as his mother transformed in a river of butterflies and roses, he questioned the reasons that kept his mother from running to a better delta as she was doing now. He kept on crying in silence. He kept on watching his mother go away. And he kept on asking (as he did as child) why if she was made up of the same water rivers are, water that always keeps on moving toward the open arms of the sea, she kept still like rock for so many years.

But the confusion and the questioning ended. He realized his mother was dying in front of him. That she was becoming the river he always wished. And a feeling of anxiety crippled his heart. He decided to rescue her. He wanted to stop her transformation. He wanted to rescue himself. He didn’t want to be transformed in the rock that his mother was. Hi did not want to be the rock the river of monarch butterflies and pink and yellow roses passed by. And without even realizing it, he tried to grasp between his hands his mother. But he couldn’t. All he could get between his warm hands were two cold tears that were distilling still the smell of roses and butterflies in the morning. Only two tears that appeared to evaporate slowly over the palms of his hands. But they were not evaporating. They were fusing with him. They were entering his heart. They were entering his mind. They were entering his eyes.

And suddenly the only thing he could see was a blurred image of his mother. The same blurred image he has been holding to all those years that he has been away from his home. But this time the image was not alone, this time it had Libertad’s voice also. A voice that claimed for forgiveness. A voice that aimed for the love of his child. He tried to cry. But he couldn’t. His mother has taken his tears away. So he left, without any tears over his face. He left dry as when he entered his old home at Deadpan. Dry as Deadpan itself. From that day on he couldn’t cry anymore. Although he did see that blurred image again infinite times.

People from Deadpan tried to contact him. But none of them was able to find him. He did not want to go to the burial of his mother. He thought it was stupid. They did not have a body to bury. They did not know it was not the cancer that killed her. He was the killer of his mother. He was the reason she was dead. His tears embedded with the fire of anger killed her; transformed her into the salty water that smelled like roses and butterflies, gave her the freedom she never had as a rock. And those same salty waters that escape into the dry dirt of Deadpan found a refuge in his dried eyes. She was buried in his eyes. It did not make any sense to hold a funeral for someone who was already buried. Anyway, they wanted to have a Christian burial for Libertad, as she would’ve wanted they said. And so they had. They went to church with an empty coffin. They prayed for a soul they did not know where it was. And they buried a person they were not sure was dead since they do not have her body.

He was so sad. He could not remember to be so sad in his life before, not even when he had to leave his old house in Sabbia. But he didn’t cry that day, neither the day his wife passed away, nor the day his father died, not even the day his daughter told him she was pregnant and she was planning on raising the child by herself. He had a reason to be sad, they were burying his mother and she was still alive in the deepest place underneath the ball of his eyes.

She still existed in two little tears that had for home his dark eyes. She still existed in the smell of roses and butterflies; in the blurred images that has tormented him all his life. He didn’t comprehend fully all that for a long time. But one day he was walking down the street; leaves were falling from the trees, and a rain of stars was brightening the night. And suddenly it started raining. He wasn’t sure, but he could swear it hadn’t rained since the night his wife passed away and her daughter was born. That was six years ago. But after all it was Deadpan; people are used not to see rain so often. He was used to it too by now, as he was now used to listen to the voice of his dead mother talking to him.

XII

His eyes were clouded like the first time he felt the voice of his mother after she died between his hands. He was trying to cry, just like the first time when he was mourning his mother. But all he got were memories. Memories of the fights his mother and his father used to have, memories of the day he went to the plaza and discovered his dad cheating, memories of his pain. All memories . . . But so vividly, so real, so unaltered that he was living them all over again as if time hadn’t passed by. As if he were a boy behind the windows listening scared to his father yelling. So authentic that he couldn’t recognize the voice of Libertad trying to reach to his heart.

But there it was her voice, as clear as the morning, as soft as the rain, as beautiful as roses and butterflies. Telling him he should not worry anymore. Telling him he should forgive his dad. Telling him she knew better than him; that she knew his heart could not bear hatred; that his heart could not stand injustice; that his heart was still as fluid as water pouring from the skies. And he wanted to sob, but he couldn’t. Because every time he tried to weep his eyes clouded, his eyelids burned, and the voice of his mother appeared. She was imprisoned in his eyes but she didn’t want to be free, she has become his tears but she didn’t want her son to cry anymore as she did not want to see him crying when he was a boy. But he needed to cry.

XIII

The news of his father’s death needed to be mourn. He couldn’t bear to go to his burial and don’t cry. As he couldn’t bear to relive all the pain he went through with his mother’s death every time she felt the need to present to him a premonition. It was too much for him. His heart felt like it was going to be liquefied. His guts stretched. And his eyes wanted to silence the voice of his mother, to let her out. But they couldn’t. Every time they tried the voice within them became more intense. His eyes became clouded like the first time when he felt the voice of his mother after she died between his hands. And he succumbed to the premonition.

It has been always the same way. Memories start appearing. The pain starts to be relieved. And his eyes begin to cloud. Then, suddenly, a smell of roses and butterflies fills the air. He knows what is about to come. He knows the voice of his mother will fill his eyes. It has been this way since the first time. It was the same when she announced his dad was dying. It was the same when she announced him his wife María José was having his daughter.

XIV

He was walking down the street; leaves were falling from the trees; and a rain of stars was brightening the night. But suddenly it started raining. He wasn’t sure, but he could swear it hadn’t rained since the night his mother passed away. That was ten years ago. But after all it was Deadpan; people are used not to see rain so often. He was used to it too by now, as he was used to relieving his memories. But this time, it was different.

Memories started appearing. He started to relieve his childhood pain. His eyes began to cloud. Then, suddenly, a smell of roses and butterflies filled the air. He knew what was about to come. He knew the voice of his mother will fill his eyes. But he didn’t know that she wasn’t going to give him sad news.

Her voiced filled his eyes as it used to, but the memories started to change. He didn’t see himself as a child; he didn’t remember his dad infidelities; he didn’t relive his mother pain. To the contrary, he remembered the happiest day of his life, the day of his marriage. He was reliving the moments of his first encounter with María José when his mother’s voice flooded his eyes with the news of the birth of his only daughter.

He couldn’t wait until his eyesight was reestablished. He started running home even though he was almost blind. He wanted to experiment the same happiness of the memories his mother made him relive. He arrived home and started looking for his wife. But all he found was one of his neighbors. His neighbor told him his wife was at the Deadpan private hospital. He immediately took the train and went down to the hospital. Only to find out his wife had died. He felt betrayed by his mother. He wished he could pull out from behind his dark eyeballs those two tears that smell like roses and butterflies. They were only omen of sadness. He tried to cry. He tried to let those two tears come out. But he couldn’t. All he felt were his eyeballs burning like falling stars in the cold sky. He was so involved in his sadness in his struggle with her mother that he not even realized his daughter Soledad was born.

XVI

He was so sad. He could not remember to be so sad in his life before, not even when he had to leave his old house in Sabbia. But he didn’t cry that day. He couldn’t. He didn’t say anything either. He couldn’t. He had lost all the little happiness he had. It was like the day his daughter told him she was pregnant and was planning on raising the child by herself. It was like the day he went to the burial of his father and couldn’t cry. It was like being under hot water and still feeling cold.

That’s how he feels today fifty-six years later. Like a cold rock under a warm sea. Like a child without a conscience. Like an old man without a story. He cannot bear the caress of the water any longer. Is like a remembrance of his past. He wants the voice of his mother to fade out. He wants to be free from her, from his dad, from the sorrow, from his wife, from his daughter, from the pain, from himself. He wants to get out of the shower and walk around Deadpan for a last time.

It so decided. He has begun walking. He is walking down the street; leaves are falling from the trees, and a rain of stars is brightening the night. But suddenly it has started to rain. He is not sure but he could swear it hadn’t rained since the night his father passed away. That was fourteen years ago. But after all it’s Deadpan; people are used not to see rain so often. He is used to it too by now. As he is used to relieved his memories. But this time again, is different.

XVII

Memories have started to appear, he has started to relieve his childhood pain, his eyes have begun to cloud, and suddenly a smell of roses and butterflies has filled the air. He knows what is about to come. He knows the voice of his mother will fill his eyes. But he doesn’t know what type of news would be.

Libertad’s voice is filling his eyes as it has done so many times before. But his memories seem to be out of order, unconnected. He is remembering the saddest and the happiest days of his life at the same time. He can see himself as a child; he can remember his dad infidelities; he can relive his mother pain. But at the same time he is remembering the day of his marriage, the baptism of Soledad. He is reliving the moments of Soledad’s birth and the death of María José while his mother’s voice starts flooding his eyes with the news of the birth of his granddaughter. “She is in the hospital; go; be by her side.” Libertad’s voice keeps on repeating. “She is in the hospital; go; be by her side.” Libertad’s voice keeps on repeating. “She is in the hospital; go; be by her side.” Libertad’s voice keeps on repeating. “She is in the hospital; go; be by her side.”

He cannot stand anymore. Her voice is becoming as heavy as a rock. He has decided to go. He is going. He is there. As he enters her room he is well aware of that smell. The smell of roses and butterflies. Has his daughter been crying the same tears his mother cried the day she was born? Has his daughter been crying the same tears his mother cried the day he was born? Has his daughter been crying the same tears his mother cried the day she died? It has passed fourteen years since he had felt again the smell of pink and yellow roses and monarch butterflies. It has passed fourteen years since his father died. It has passed twenty years since Soledad was born. It has passed seventy-nine years since his mother was born. And still history was repeating itself. He knew the story, but his daughter didn’t. He had heard it like a thousand times. But he was living it now.

XVIII

His granddaughter is coming into the world crying as his mother did. Nobody knows the reason, but she is crying. And her tears smell like roses in the morning. Like roses celebrating life, love and freedom. That’s why her mother, Soledad, is deciding to name her Libertad because she smells like roses celebrating life, love and freedom. Soledad never knew the name of her grandmother. She never knew the story of her father. But still she is here repeating it. Well, that is what his father believes. But she is not. She is writing a new chapter in her father’s life, she is rewriting his father family history. She would raise that child by herself and with the help of his dad. She won’t sacrifice her happiness or her daughter’s. Libertad will plant the weaknesses his mother did not plant into his soul.

XIX

“Don’t cry dad”, Soledad is saying. He wasn’t aware he has been crying since he felt the smell of his granddaughter Libertad. There are so many tears over his face. And yet there is so little to cry about. At least, so he thought . . .

Eufemismos

2010-02-06T15:16:00.004-04:00

Un silencio se precipita en mis huesos.

La ciudad ha muerto. No la conozco.

El hombre inimaginado trancó la puerta.

Salió. No se fue despidiendo.

Mi cuerpo se hace cada vez más ajeno.

Entre rascacielos de recuerdos sobreexpuestos, duermo.

El hombre inimaginado torció la mirada.

Las pisadas de una felicidad truncada, relegó en el suelo.

Burbujas de vacío explotan en mi pecho.

El ruido de las calles no alcanza mi aposento.

El hombre inimaginado enterró el alma.

Un mutismo estremeció su cuerpo.

Con mi conato de valentía, reaparezco.

He tirado a las rieles los eufemismos de nuestros encuentros.

El hombre inimaginado se desacerca.

De sus puños caen los efímeros afectos.

Ha barrido Il Paradiso promesso.

Con todas las esperanzas desalbergadas lo espero.

Su ausencia no es más un consuelo.

Tango vespertino

2010-02-03T13:31:00.003-04:00

Macero las semillas

del hombre inerte en fuga

que se refugia en mi lecho

entre el letargo del no-rechazo-no-acepto.

La apología de su sexo y el mío

parece haberse malgastado

en el eufemismo cotidiano de nuestros gestos.

(De fondo: el tango vespertino)

El vaho alcohólico de sus adentros

destila la promiscuidad otoñal

en la que satisfago la pseudo indigencia de mi seo.

Escudriño los añicos de sus silencios

con la convicción

de hallar una razón

para escarbar en un cuerpo ajeno…

Con las últimas piedras de estoicismo

que nos restan,

remuevo las tierras fermentadas

de mis desasosiegos.

Termino perplejo,

sin respuesta,

con mis manos hedientas

al sueño imperecedero de su recuerdo.

On Hart and Secondary Rules as a Mechanism to Eradicate the Deficiencies of a Primary Rules Only System

2010-01-28T18:15:00.002-04:00

Hart contests that secondary rules which do not exist in primitive societies serve as the basis for the establishment of a legal society in which the deficiencies of a primary rules only system are eradicated. Although I agree with Hart that the existence of secondary rules is an indicator of the existence of a society with a legal system per se, I do not agree with his contention that the creation and incorporation of secondary rules eradicate in all instances the deficiencies which arise by having a system with only primary rules. His explanation seems to me to be insufficient in accurately describing legal systems. I believe that in any given legal system the deficiencies he associates with primary rules only systems would also exist, as the legal system interacts with other social institutions or becomes the object of political considerations. The regulation of sodomy is the perfect example of how the deficiencies to which Hart makes reference can survive even in a system with secondary rules in place.

Hart affirms that in any pre-legal system one would be able to observe the following deficiencies or defects: 1. uncertainty; 2. static; and 3. inefficiency. Uncertainty refers to the lack of a procedure for settling the doubts that arise regarding what the rules are and their scope and validity. To eradicate the aforementioned uncertainty it is necessary to introduce a rule of recognition. With the rule of recognition in place the validity and the scope of a primary rule can be measured by corroborating if the latter was enacted by the powers authorized to do so and by confirming its validity by corroborating its accordance to a specific rule of higher hierarchy. For instance, for a criminal statute like the prohibition of sodomy to be valid it has to conform to the following rule of recognition: be lawfully enacted by the legislature of a state, proscribe clearly a conduct without ambiguities and be constitutionally sound. Courts throughout the history of sodomy statues have tried to remove the uncertainty traditionally attach to those statutes which used to refer to the crime as the offensive crime against nature by specifying the conduct refer by that phrase and by upholding its constitutionality. However, the certainty of the rule of recognition seems to be attached to the political swings of the government. With a change in the composition of the Supreme Court, in less than ten years, the rule of recognition was interpreted not to serve as basis to uphold the constitutionality of sodomy statues as it once did. Hence, citizens know that the validity of a primary rule can be in fact uncertain, even if there is a mechanism to establish its certainty; since it can depend on political swings.

Likewise, the defect of static might not be removed as easily as Hart thinks by just enacting rules of change. The defect of static refers to the fact that the only way to change the primary rules of a society without secondary rules in place is by the slow process of growth whereby the conduct sanctioned became habitual and tolerated. Since there is no mechanism available in such society to introduce new rules and eliminate old ones, the change comes from the slow change in social behavior and acceptance. Yet, the creation of secondary rules that establish a formal mechanism for the enacting and derogation of rules does not guarantee that the defect of static will be eradicated. For example, sodomy statues were not being enforced by years and more people were publicly admitting to be engaging in sexual conduct defined as sodomy. People were also actively advocating for the decriminalization of sodomy. However, the campaign for the decriminalization was not successful in states in which religions institutions were powerful enough to preclude the legislatures to equate the criminal code to the social consensus and practices of their communities. Furthermore, the other mechanism of rule changing available, the courts, were also static for the most part. In fact, when they decided to engage in the process to change the primary rule prohibiting sodomy, they did it on the same basis that it would have been done on a primary rules only system. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court in Lawrence based its decision on the fact that sodomy by a slow process became habitual and tolerated and was not being sanctioned by most of the States of the Western World. Thus, social institutions can hamper the ability of rules of change to eradicate the static defect and make a legal system revert to the mechanism of change utilized in a primitive one.

Similarly, the defect of inefficiency can be maintained in a system with secondary rules in place. Hart argues that inefficiency is the lack of an official agency to determine that a violation has taken place and punish the offenders. This defect can be eradicated by the enactment of rules of adjudication which establish the legal actors with capacity to adjudicate violations to the primary rules and the procedures to determine those violations and punish them. Nonetheless, the existence of these rules of adjudication is not a guarantee that the legal actors called to enforce the primary rules will indeed adjudicate the violations. Sodomy is the perfect example; the criminal statues against non procreative sex were hardly enforced. Even more, in Puerto Rico a lesbian woman tried to get arrested under the statute in order to challenge the constitutionality of the prohibition and the Police refused to arrest her and the Supreme Court of the Island refused to hear the case just to evade the political and social pressures of decriminalizing sodomy. Thus, once again, we can see how the larger socio-political interactions taking place in a determinate community interfere with the ability of secondary rules to eradicate the defects that primary rules only systems present.

In sum, secondary rules do not necessary guarantee that the defects of uncertainty, static and inefficiency will be eradicated from a legal system, since political considerations and social institutions can always interfere and preserve those deficiencies.